Deal Aware

Mergers & Acquisitions and Corporate Restructuring

Articles by "In-house Publications"
Guest Contributions In-house Publications

 

non-compete

(Pranshu Gupta and Roopam Dadhich are IV year B.A.LL.B students at National Academy of Legal Studies & Research (NALSAR) University, Hyderabad)
 
INTRODUCTION

In almost every Mergers & Acquisitions (‘M&A’) contract, the presence of a provision containing non-compete obligations of the target company is a common phenomenon, and is one of the most integral parts of M&A deals. These provisions are referred to as ‘non-compete clauses’ (‘NCC’). They are included in contracts so that the valuable information such as the intellectual property, trade secrets, technical know-how etc. possessed by people related to the target company may not be used to the disadvantage of the acquiring firm post acquisition, and to save the investment value of the transaction. These provisions are governed by the exception to Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which permits contracts restricting a person or an entity from carrying on a similar business where the goodwill is being sold, as long as the restriction pertains only to specified reasonable limits.

NCCs in all M&A agreements need to be reviewed by the Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’) as per the CCI (Procedure in regard to the transaction of business relating to combinations) Regulations, 2011 (‘Combination Regulations’). This article discusses and analyses the legal developments with regards to NCCs and the way in which courts in India have dealt with these clauses.
 
LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AND JUDICIAL STANCE

At present, para 5.7 of Form I in the Combination Regulations mandates a detailed explanation and justification of NCCs present in an M&A agreement, which the CCI reviews and analyses in view of Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 (‘the Act’) thereby ensuring there is no unfair impact on competition. In this regard, the CCI in 2017 released a Guidance Note wherein the scope of NCCs was specified taking into account its decisions in various cases. In this Guidance, the CCI noted that only an ‘ancillary restriction’, or a restriction that is directly related and necessary for the implementation of a transaction shall be permitted. A restriction is considered to be directly related when it is economically related to the transaction and is intended to allow a smooth transition to the post-transaction scenario. 
 
The necessity of a non-compete restriction should be assessed in terms of whether, in the absence of such restriction, the transaction can be implemented or whether it will be more onerous on the parties. If it is not directly related and necessary to the transaction, the CCI will approve the combination without approving the non-compete restriction. In such cases, the CCI’s order would state that the non-compete restriction is not “ancillary” to the combination. However, the finding that a non-compete restriction is not in compliance of the Guidance does not mean it infringes the provisions of the Act. Moreover, the standards set forth in the Guidance would not be applied mechanically, and would be applied taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case. The Guidance Note released by the CCI is similar to the Ancillary Note released by the European Commission which envisages similar guidelines for assessment of ancillary restraints in merger deals.

Recently, the CCI in its press release dated May 15, 2020 proposed to omit para 5.7 of Form I in the Combination Regulations which requires the parties to submit a detailed explanation and justification of NCCs under the agreement. The intention is to provide flexibility to the parties in determining non-compete restrictions and reduce the information burden on the CCI by transferring the onus to the parties. Moreover, the rationale was that prescribing a general set of standards for assessment of non-compete restrictions may not be appropriate in modern business environments. Further, conducting a detailed examination on a case by case basis as part of the combination review process may not be feasible considering the tight time cap of 210 days for combination approvals prescribed under the Act. However, the Guidance still holds ground and the parties need to self-assess if the NCC is ancillary to the transaction and no issues arise under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.

The question of NCCs being ancillary to the transactions depends upon the factual matrix of each case. However, an analysis of the past decisions of courts and the CCI could help companies determine the general approach/standards observed by courts and the CCI while reviewing NCCs in M&A transactions. In Orchid Chemicals, the first ever case on NCC, the CCI found the provision on non-compete restrictive of competition, where Orchid Chemicals and the promoter were restricted for 8 years and 5 years respectively to carry out similar business activities. It was observed that non-compete obligations should be reasonable, particularly in respect of geographical limits, business activities, the duration over which such restraint was enforceable and the people subject to such restraint, in order to ensure that there is no adverse impact on competition. Pursuant to this observation of the CCI, the parties had to modify the term of the NCC to 4 years for both the company and the promoter. The parties also modified the NCC to permit research, development and testing of certain new active pharmaceutical ingredients.

In Affle Holdings v. Saurabh Singh, the Delhi High Court upheld a share purchase agreement which restricted the promoter from engaging in a similar business for 36 months. The duration of such non-compete was found reasonable by the court. In Mylan Inc., the CCI did not uphold the NCC and the parties thereby revised it to cover only those products that were produced or sold by the target company, allowing the promoters of the target company to conduct research and development of new active pharmaceutical ingredients. They were also compelled to reduce the non-compete duration from 6 years to 4 years. In Crompton Greaves Consumer Electricals, the CCI approved the NCC only when the parties agreed to modify the duration of non-compete from 5 years to 3 years.

It is therefore, evident that the CCI has in a number of cases compelled parties to modify NCCs on lines of the Guidance which lays down the duration of an NCC for a period of up to 2 years in case of transfer of goodwill and 3 years in cases of transfer of goodwill and know-how. Even though the CCI has done away with the requirement for the parties to provide a detailed assessment and justification of the non-compete restriction, the judicial precedents along with the Guidance can help counsels of both the parties to determine the CCI’s expectations in terms of the duration, geographical limits, business activities etc. of NCCs in the agreement, as they still need to conduct a comprehensive self-assessment of such clauses in light of the competition law as the CCI will still review transaction documents and approve a combination only when it does not go against Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS

This seems to be a step in the right direction by the CCI, especially when attracting foreign capital and investments is a major goal for the country; which would have been difficult earlier owing to the onerous formalities of the CCI and its stringent compliance mechanisms. Till now, parties with their counsels’ assistance have already been conducting a detailed self-assessment of non-compete restrictions to ensure compliance of the competition law. However, the CCI while reviewing merger deals has in numerous cases held NCCs to be anti-competitive and non-ancillary, without providing any justification/analysis whatsoever. With this amendment, the process would become more efficient without compromising on the requirement of the parties to undertake a comprehensive anti-trust self-assessment of NCCs in M&A deals. 
 
However, more efficiency can be ensured if the CCI becomes less stringent in terms of reviewing these clauses and takes into account facts and circumstances of each case, departing from its standards created through judicial decisions and the Guidance Note. Treating certain transactions as exceptions is essential especially in dynamic and other stable industries (where customer loyalty is for a longer period or an industry which is highly capital intensive) which would justify a longer non-compete period, and at the same time not casting an adverse impact on competition. Therefore, the implementation of ancillary restrictions necessitates a balance between sustaining fair competition in the market and stimulating a healthy business transaction.


Keywords: Demerger, Companies Act 2013, Company Examples, Corporate restructuring
K
Keywords: Demerger, shareholder value, corporate, corporate restructuring, Jio Demerger
demerger


(Dhruv Thakur is a IV year, B.B.A.LL.B student at Gujarat National Law University, GNLU)

INTRODUCTION:

Companies have now figured out that a diversified business model under one listed entity fails to attract the required valuation. In the previous decade, India witnessed a trend where companies rambled diversification drives beyond their central businesses. However, in today’s era, there is a clear inclination towards value unlocking by demerging business units which indicates many of them have now realized that the diversified business model does not work well in terms of stock valuations and fundraising compared to companies which stayed focused on their core businesses. But the question is whether in the last few years demergers have created value for shareholders? Before diving into that it is important to get familiarized with the fundamental idea behind a demerger.

DEFINITION AND RATIONALE OF A DEMERGER:

A Demerger is essentially separation of one or more units of a company to either be liquidated or form a new company independent from the original one. Primarily, demergers are a form of corporate restructuring the objective behind which is to promote specialization. Sections 230 to 240 of Chapter XV of the Companies Act, 2013 (hereinafter ‘CA, 2013’) read with the Companies (Compromises, Arrangements and Amalgamations) Rules, 2016 are the applicable provisions in case of a demerger. The term ’demerger’ is not defined under the CA, 2013 per se but explanation to Section 230 (1) allows for division of shares of different classes as a route for the readjustment of share capital. Section 2 (19AA) of Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter ‘IT Act’)defines a demerger as-

Demerger”, in relation to companies, means the transfer, pursuant to a scheme of arrangement under sections 391 to 394 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956, old act), by a demerged company of its one or more undertakings to any resulting company…

However, it was held by the High Court of Delhi in the matter of Indo Rama Synthetics Ltd. that the definition under the IT Act was only for the mere purpose of making sure that the demerger was tax neutral, irrespective of whether it fulfills other conditions as regarded by the IT Act.

The rationale behind pursuing demergers is based on the many benefits if offers, which works as motives for a company to initiate the process. It allows a specific division or unit to grow as a separate and focused entity, thereby increasing its efficiency and effectiveness.

To illustrate better, Reliance Jio Infocom Ltd. (hereinafter ‘RJI’) which had three primary undertakings namely (a) digital services business, (b) optical fibre business, and (c) tower infrastructure business went for an NCLT approved demerger process in 2019. It transferred the optical fibre business to a newly formed company ‘Jio Fibre Pvt Ltd.’ and the tower infrastructure business to an existing company ‘Reliance Jio Infratel Pvt Ltd’. However,the digital services business was retained with the original company (RJI).

Each of the three undertakings do have a distinct strategy, separate industry specific risks and operate inter alia under differentiated market dynamics. Even the competition involved in each of the businesses is different from the other two. Hence, segregation of the company by a demerger will incorporate enhanced focus of each of the undertakings and help exploit varied opportunities in their respective fields. Here’s a link to RJI’s composite scheme of arrangement.

Further, in a few cases of family owned companies, demergers are also used to give effect to family partitions, for instance the division of Ambani Group in 2013 between Anil and Mukesh Ambani, splitting up Reliance Industries Ltd. into four distinct entities.

WAYS TO GIVE EFFECT TO A MERGER:

Agreement between the promoters

Under this case a company may hive off its undertaking to a new resulting company. ​ This new company formed due to the demerger issues shares of the resulting company to shareholders of the parent company as consideration. The assets and liabilities pertaining to the undertaking which has been demerged will be transferred to the new resulting company.

2. Demerger under the scheme of arrangement

Similar to the amalgamation process, in this case approval from the NCLT, under CA, 2013 is mandatory. Provisions governing this route are Sections 230-232 of the CA, 2013. However, this route is only permissible if the Memorandum of Association (hereinafter ‘MoA’) and Articles of Association (hereinafter ‘AoA’) of the company allow for such a process. If not, then the first step would be to amend the AOA of the company by passing a special resolution in the general meeting.

3. Demerger under voluntary winding up and the power of liquidator

After the split of the original company into various companies, the original company can go for voluntary winding up under Section 270 of the CA, 2013. Original company may transfer or sell its workings to the resulting companies.

DEMERGERS AND SHAREHOLDERS' VALUE:

Demergers benefit the shareholders of the company by providing them shares of the applicant company (which is going for the demerger) as well as the resulting company (company segregated from applicant company), which in turn divests better opportunities to participate in the management, decision making process, operations and profits.

But is shareholder value in practice enhanced by demergers and spin-offs? It depends and needs to be carefully examined, as with everything else in life. It is a well-known fact that one of the major objectives behind demergers is to increase the shareholder value. Disposal of any undertaking, will replace cash and/or securities for assets. The benefits to shareholders are mightily dependent on the reaction of the stock market. The typical situation is where the subsidiary is in a high rated sector (rated highly by the market) and the seller is outmoded. Then as an inevitable result demerger unlocks the hidden value for shareholders who receive a part in the demerged equity.

To give an example, in 2016 Crompton Greaves through a court approved process demerged its consumer product business into a separate listed company ‘Crompton Greaves Consumer Electrical’. Consequentially, shareholders of Crompton Greaves were issued shares in the resulting company, The result of the arrangement was a 57% combined return of both original and resulting undertaking since its record date on March 16, 2016.

CONCLUSION:

Well, ideally shareholders of the demerged undertakings do reap the benefits of higher focussed businesses with management accountability driving the intrinsic value of each company, propelling their respective share prices higher than had they remained a combined entity. And spin-offs are usually preferred over IPOs by investors due to their assets being better known and better positioning of incentives due to the parent company’s wish for the progeny to succeed. That being said, have spin-offs underachieved after being demerged?

A few definitely have. All things considered, one thing is for certain, be it Crompton Greeves 2016 demerger (57% combined return) or Reliance Jio Infocom’s 2019 demerger, the value generated for shareholders is positively reflected in the market price of the demerged and resulting corporate entities where the split in undertakings is well defined and better thought out.

Keywords: L&T, Mindtree, hostile takeovers

L&T Hostile Takeover of Mindtree

(Pranshu Gupta is a IV year B.A.LL.B student aNational Academy of Legal Studies & Research (NALSAR) University, Hyderabad) 

INTRODUCTION
Recently, Mindtree Ltd., an IT services firm went through a hostile takeover by the technology and engineering giant Larsen & Toubro (L&T), which is the first such takeover in India in the IT sector. In the M&A sector, takeovers are a general phenomenon.

However, a hostile takeover is particularly rare, especially in the context of India. In this article, the legal implications of the moves of both the companies in the takeover battle would be discussed in terms of the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover) Regulations, 2011 (hereinafter ‘Takeover Code’).

BACKGROUND
L&T acquired approximately 66% stake in Mindtree in a three-pronged process:
  • Firstly, L&T purchased 20.32% stake of coffee baron V.G. Siddhartha for an amount of Rs. 3,369 crores under a share purchase agreement. He was the single largest non-promoter shareholder in the company.
  • Secondly, it made an on-market purchase of around 15% shares of Mindtree through their broker, subject to various regulatory approvals.
  • Lastly, L&T made an open-offer for an additional 31% shares in Mindtree.
In this background, it becomes essential to discuss the legality of Mindtree’s moves to avert the takeover; and L&T’s moves to pursue the same.

THE LEGALITY OF MINDTREE'S MOVES
In order to prevent the hostile takeover by L&T, Mindtree considered a proposal of buyback of its fully paid up equity shares in its board meeting dated 20th March 2019. However, in the adjourned meeting dated 26th March 2019, the proposal of buyback was dropped. Seemingly, this was intended to be used as a ‘poison pill’ by sucking out surplus cash from the company.

A ‘poison pill’ is a tool employed by a target company as a takeover defence mechanism in a hostile takeover so as to make it less desirable to the acquirer, or to make the transaction too expensive. It is called poison pill because it can also lead to a decrease in shareholder value and might create hardships for the management in the future.

In the present case, on April 17, Mindtree approved an interim dividend of Rs 3 per share, a final dividend of Rs 4 per share and a special dividend of Rs 20 per share to celebrate the twin achievements of exceeding $1 billion annual revenue milestone and the 20th anniversary of the company. While the interim dividend was payable on April 27, the final and special dividend would be payable upon receiving shareholders’ approval in the next Annual General Meeting (hereinafter ‘AGM’). This move would result in the severance of Rs. 530 crores from the cash reserves out of a total Rs. 1,100 crores as on March 2019, thereby making the takeover less desirable and expensive.

As per Regulation 26 of the Takeover Code, it is the duty of the board of directors of the target company to make sure that the business of the target company is conducted in the ordinary course, consistent with past practices during the offer period. Also, no material assets shall be alienated during this period unless an approval has been obtained from the shareholders through a special resolution. In the present case, although alienation of Rs. 530 crores from the company reserves might amount to an ‘alienation of material assets’, the strategy adopted by Mindtree is legally valid under the Takeover Code.
  • Firstly, going by the company’s past practice, Mindtree has declared special dividends on four separate occasions in the last 10 years in the range of Rs 1 to Rs 5 per share marking the completion of its 10 and 15-year anniversaries, 10 years since IPO, and crossing $100 million in revenue.
  • Secondly, announcement of special dividend at Rs. 20 per share would though be considered as substantial alienation of assets, it falls within the ordinary course of business and past practices at the same time. Mindtree has declared special dividend 4 times in the past ten years. Also, the declaration of special dividends was not in retaliation to the takeover bid by L&T, but to celebrate its 20 years of operation and crossing revenues of billion dollars a year.
  • Lastly, the declaration of dividends is pending approval from the shareholders in its AGM, not violating Regulation 26 of the Takeover Code.
In this manner, none of the moves of Mindtree to prevent the takeover could be considered as legally invalid.

THE LEGALITY OF L&T'S MOVES
An analysis of L&T’s moves depicts the sharp-witted tactics employed by it in order to takeover Mindtree. In a normal scenario, when a company tries to acquire another, it can offer to gain control if it owns 25 per cent stake of the company it is trying to acquire. However, L&T did not own 25% ownership of the company. So, L&T used a loophole in the Takeover Code to pursue the takeover.

It used Regulation 3(1) along with Regulation 4 and 6 of the Takeover Code, which entitles L&T to make an open offer to acquire public shareholding in the company. As per this provision, those with a 25% stake or more cannot take over a company unless an open offer has been made to acquire shares of a company with a public announcement.

However, the Takeover Code also says whether or not one holds shares or voting rights in the company, one is not eligible to take control unless a public announcement of an offer to acquire those shares is made. This allowed L&T to make an open offer, without owning 25% stake in Mindtree.

Moreover, the CCI granted its approval required under Section 5 of the Competition Act, 2002; and Regulation 18(11) of the Takeover Code. Therefore, it can be said that all the moves of L&T are legally valid, even though the anomalies in the Takeover Code have been utilized for its own benefit.

CONCLUSION
In this battle of legal acumen, both the companies employed various tactics to achieve their goals. But Mindtree lost the battle ultimately getting taken over by L&T. While the strategy of L&T can be appreciated, at the same time, it reflects the violation of corporate ethics and governance due to lacunae in the governing law. Hostile takeovers have certain adverse effects, such as reduction in company value, affecting employees’ morale which might turn into animosity towards the acquirer and so on.

Post Mindtree’s hostile takeover SEBI had introduced the ‘DVR Framework’ which permitted issuance of shares with differential voting rights in order to protect companies (especially startups) from hostile takeovers by enabling promoters to retain voting rights in excess to their share capital. Although introduction of DVR Framework by SEBI in order to protect companies from such threats could be admired, it should be noted that this does not solve the underlying issue.

The underlying issue is anomaly in the Takeover Code and there being no protective mechanisms preventing hostile takeovers within the code itself. Therefore, SEBI should definitely amend the Takeover Code by rectifying the existing inconsistency and inserting requisite safeguards.

                                                                                                                 -By Pranshu Gupta


Keywords: Covid-19, M&A, MAC, Cross-border


(Dhruv Thakur is a IV year, B.B.A.LL.B student at Gujarat National Law University, GNLU)

INTRODUCTION:

The world is facing the challenges transpired due to a global pandemic, and it has already manifested into an economic crisis as evinced by International Monetary Fund. This is surely expected to bring hard-hitting and drastic blows to the M&A scenario. As globalization faces the risk of an impending doom this can especially affect cross border transactions.

Material Adverse Change (MAC) clause is a protective measure which divests the right to either party to terminate the agreement in case of a material change of events or a development which adversely affects the feasibility of the transaction or the company. In these circumstances, as a resort to repudiate transactions, it wouldn’t be unlikely to see the invocation of MAC Clauses in Merger/Investment Agreements.


MAC is available as a recourse from the signing of the agreement to the completion of the transaction. This is usually one of the most rigorously negotiated clauses but is hardly enforced. With respect to ongoing transactions, the most significant aspect of MAC clauses is their specific wording which will determine if COVID-19 can be taken into consideration or not. Buyers/Investors like to keep the scope of MAC clauses broad whereas the sellers like it as narrow as possible.

CAN COVID-19 SET-OFF MAC? 


In scenarios where the signing of the agreement is complete, it is pertinent to note whether “acts of God” (force majeure) or “pandemics” “changes in financial/political/market conditions” are specifically excluded, in which case it would be difficult for the Investor to utilise the MAC clause. However, if not excluded, then to determine the materiality threshold, guidance needs to be taken from the specific wording of the MAC clause.

Usually, courts have deemed a high bar for the occurrence of a MAC event and interpreted MAC clauses narrowly, stating that MAC is any change or event which will render it impossible for any reasonable party to enter into such transactions. There is an evident lack of structured guidelines by the courts.

Indian laws also stipulate that anything that makes it impossible or prevents a prudent person from the fulfillment of their obligation due to turbulent circumstances can be deemed as MAC. 
Regulation 23(1) (c) of the SEBI Takeover Code, enunciates that the parties under a contract can withdraw from the obligations, if for reasons beyond the reasonable control of the parties it becomes impossible to meet the conditions stipulated therein. Further, courts have also stressed upon the direct correlation between materiality and duration period of the change. It essentially means the development should have durational significance which is a concept even US Court’s Judgements rely upon, which is the assessment of the long-term impact caused by the event.

CROSS BORDER IMPLICATIONS:


Further, most importantly Cross-border transactions are in a rocky boat due to the supply chain being hampered. To elucidate, a major challenge to cross border transactions is that governments across the world are using lockdowns as a countermeasure against COVID-19 which has hampered the cross-border supply chain for goods and services due to constraints on movement of labour and sealed borders. Cross border transaction agreements usually carry a MAC provision for risks and costs which includes a situation of a change in law, post entering the agreement.

In cross border transactions, generally the parties have a predetermined jurisdiction that they would be subjected to, essentially meaning that any relief would not be provided to the injured party, in case the change in law falls outside of such predetermined jurisdiction. Although, principally the restrictions are the same across all jurisdictions since the entire global economy is combating COVID-19.

Hence, attempt must be made to diligently scrutinize the MAC provision, placing the restrictions apropos the lockdown under its ambit. Consequently, it becomes imperative to carefully evaluate the MAC provision as there may be scenarios where a change in law in one particular jurisdiction is not contemplate a change in law in another one.

However, in case ambiguities still persist, the affected party can terminate the agreement for the cross-border transaction, the availability of which heavily rests upon on how the MAC clause under the agreement has been worded. Therefore, it is essential that the MAC provision is devised with utmost attention to detail and a precise materiality threshold in order to solicit the same to a COVID-19 like situation, and it can help steer clear of cumbersome & expensive litigation.

In cross border transactions where the agreement has not been executed yet, more than anything else, both parties must clearly define the risk allocations amongst themselves and resort to eloquent drafting of the provisions with regards to the COVID-19 pandemic, which successively may assist both the parties to mitigate the adverse effect of the pandemic.


CONTEMPORARY SCENARIO:

In India, even after nearly 100 days since the first positive case regrettably, Covid-19 still has a strong grasp over some major metropolitan cities (surely durational implications are expected) and even if pandemics are specifically excluded from MAC, the situation can still fall under events which have industry-wide implications, acts of god or events of nationwide economic impact. Further, now that the Indian Ministry of Finance has already issued an office memorandum declaring that COVID-19 can be treated as a natural calamity, it can thus constitute ‘act of god’. Even the Indian Supreme Court in a 2018 landmark judgment clarified constituents required for being declared force majeure as:

  1. the events must be beyond the reasonable control of the parties,
  2. best efforts have been undertaken to mitigate force majeure event
  3. that the same was unforeseeable by the parties and,
  4. that the event actually rendered the performance impossible or illegal.
Hence, any impact due to COVID-19 has scope to be covered under the MCA as a force majeure event.

However, ultimately the burden of proof is on the one invoking it and instituting an MAC is an extremely subjective mechanism which all boils down to facts & circumstances of each case. What stays imperative in every scenario for triggering the MAC clause is a cautious & diligent evaluation of the specific wording of the MAC clause and lastly to take all possible measures to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 upon the ability to fulfill the obligations under a contract.

Keywords: Hostile Takeover, M&A, Takeover Defenses, Cross-border M&A

(Kanisqa Agarwal is a IV year B.B.A.LL.B student at Gujarat National Law University, GNLU)

We have witnessed a rise in shareholder activism over the years in India which has developed a fertile ground for hostile takeovers. Hostile takeovers account for a huge proportion of global deal activity over the last two decades. It is only a matter of time before this trend percolates down to India markets.

The COVID-19 pandemic has wreaked havoc on the world economy and has financially distressed many companies. These dire circumstances bring in the added risk of Hostile Takeovers. It is recommended for companies to consider relevant defenses against such opportunistic activism.
Defenses against Hostile takeover can be broadly classified into:
    1. Preventive measures to be applicable before the open offer/bid comes into effect i.e. Pre-offer Defenses;
    2. Reactionary measures applicable after the open offer / bid i.e. Post-offer Defenses.
  1. PRE-OFFER DEFENCES
  • Shark repellent / Embedded Defences
This strategy involves defenses embedded in the Charter documents of the Company. This category of strategies is largely untested in Indian courts. It can be adopted by incorporating certain amendments in the company charter documents which become active only when a takeover is attempted.
  • Poison Pill
A Poison Pill can exist, among other forms, as a customized shareholders rights plan. This strategy includes a rights issue i.e. shareholders can purchase shares of the company at a considerable discount or through a two-for-one scheme.

This issue is only triggered if a particular shareholder/shareholder group purchases a specific percentage of equity, by the virtue of which they become a potential takeover bidder. The bidder is excluded from exercising their rights in such an issue. This exercise makes the hostile takeover very tedious and expensive as it would dilute the shareholding of the bidder.

The rights issue can only be introduced and rescinded by the Board and thus the potential takeover bidder has to engage in negotiations with the Board. The negotiations may lead to an agreement on an acquisition price which is mutually acceptable to the parties or the takeover fail altogether if the management of the target company is keen to retain its control and the acquirer withdraws altogether.
  • Staggered Board Defense
The strategy involves adding provisions in the Charter documents of a company restricting the number of directors than can be removed/re-elected in a financial year. Alternatively, the target company can specify classes of directors which are re-elected and specifying others which have a fixed tenure. This drags out the whole process of taking over control.
However, this defense is not really effective in India as directors of Indian Companies can be removed by the shareholders through an ordinary resolution in a general meeting (Section 169 of the Companies Act, 2013).
  • Brand Pills
Private Companies which are owned and controlled by the promoters own the Brands and/or Critical assets which are licensed or leased respectively to the listed companies.
The listed companies have made provisions in their Charter documents that automatically terminate those license/leasing agreements if the licensee/lessor i.e. the listed company ceases to be in control of the licensee entities. Moreover, an automatic termination of such agreements may not come under the ambit of restrictions imposed by Regulation 26 of the SEBI Takeover Code.

  • Golden Parachute
If a new acquirer wants to terminate top management personnel, a huge severance package needs to be paid. This additional compensation is referred to as a Golden Parachute.

An apt example of this would be that of the ex-CEO of Walt Disney, Michael Ovitz who had to be paid a severance package $140 million owing to a golden parachute in his employment. An exorbitant Golden Parachute acts as an effective deterrent for potential corporate raiders.
 
POST-OFFER DEFENSES
  • Buyback of shares at a huge premium
This strategy entails the target company purchasing its own shares from the open market. This can be done by intimating the stock exchanges, pursuant to Regulation 29(1) (b) & 29(2) of SEBI LODR Regulations, 2015, prior to the consideration of a Share Buyback in an upcoming board meeting. However, Regulation 26(2) of the Takeover Code doesn’t allow buybacks during the open offer period unless a special resolution is passed.
  • Greenmailing
Sometimes Companies are threatened with open offers to extort a payment from the promoters to dissuade the corporate raid. Greenmail refers to the process of having shares bought back from the acquirer itself at a substantial premium. Some companies incorporate special anti-greenmail clauses in their charter documents that prohibit such payments.

In addition to the greenmail, the acquirer can be made to sign a Standstill Agreement. It is an undertaking whereby the bidder agrees not to acquire more shares of the target accompany within a time certain period.
  • Asset Restructuring
The Crown Jewels strategy entails disinvesting critical assets of the company in order to make the acquisition seem unappealing to the corporate raider. The targeted company also has the option of purchasing certain assets or undertakings which makes the acquisition undesirable for the bidder or may potentially pose anti-trust issues for it.
A more radical approach to the aforementioned strategy is the Scorched Earth approach which entails selling off most, if not all, properties of appreciable value. However, this would leave the major shareholders of the company in control of a non-appreciating enterprise.

  • Pacman Defense
The is a bold and counter-aggressive strategy whereby the target company starts a reverse hostile bid on the acquiring company. The target company needs to have deep pockets to pull this off.
  • White Knight Defense
This is the most commonly used defensive maneuver against Hostile Takeovers in India. It involves getting a promoter-friendly party to buy out the company.

Alternatively, the company can employ a variant of this defense i.e. White Squire approach which involves it making a preferential allotment of equity shares or convertible securities to the friendly party, essentially freezing the minority shareholders.

Prominent instances of the White Knight strategy being used in the Indian context:
  • British American Tobacco (BAT)-controlled VST Industries employed this strategy by making ITC its white knight to combat a takeover attempt by Radhakishan Damani.
  • The promoters of Oberoi group’s EIH employed this strategy by getting RIL as its white knight to quash ITC group’s attempt to make an open offer by increasing its stake in VST by acquiring a 14.8% shareholding.
  • Kalindee Rail Nirman Ltd. employed a white knight strategy as Jupiter Metal attempted a hostile bid to acquire it. In order to fend off the takeover attempt, it approved a preferential allotment of equity shares (24.9% of equity) to Texmaco Rail & Engineering promoted by Saroj Poddar. Texmaco and Kalindee subsequently agreed to merge.
  • Saroj Kumar Poddar of the Adventz Group also acted as a white knight for Vijay Mallya when Deepak Fertilizer attempted a hostile takeover of UB Group’s Mangalore Chemicals in the form of an unsolicited open offer.
  • Mahindra Realty acted as a white knight to the Sheth family-controlled GESCO Corporation, when Abhishek Dalmia of the Renaissance Group tried to acquire it.
  •  Regulatory Bottleneck / Litigation
The targeted company sues the corporate raider for violating securities law or anti-trust laws. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) has not yet blocked a merger or an acquisition to this day, and all transactions have been given the green light after a detailed Phase II investigation.

However, it is well within the powers vested in the CCI to do so if the resultant transaction has an appreciable adverse effect on the competition in India

Contact Form

Name

Email *

Message *

Powered by Blogger.
Javascript DisablePlease Enable Javascript To See All Widget