Deal Aware

Mergers & Acquisitions and Corporate Restructuring

June 2020

Keywords: hostile takeover, Business development companies, SEC, Closed-end funds

(Amar Singh is a II year, B.A. L.LB student at Gujarat National Law University, GNLU)

INTRODUCTION:

When one company acquires another against the target company’s wishes, it is termed as a hostile takeover. This can be accomplished in either of 3 different ways:
  1. Toehold acquisition: an offer to buy stock from the existing shareholders, or
  2. Tender offer: buying majority of shares from the open market, or
  3. Proxy fight: shareholders of the target are convinced to assign their voting rights to the acquiring company so that it can boot out the management opposing the takeover and take control.
While there are various defences available to ward off a hostile takeover until recently one of them called the “Control Share Statute” under U.S. state corporate laws which is a powerful statutory anti-takeover defense was unavailable to Business Development Companies (“BDC”) and Closed-End Funds (“CEF”) which were regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“1940 Act”).

On 27th May 2020 the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”), which is the federal agency of United States Government, reversed its decade-old stance by withdrawing its 2010 no-action letter that prevented BDCs and CEFs regulated under the 1940 Act to exercise the Control Share Statute.

The 2010 letter (“Boulder Letter”) had stated that the SEC staff believed such a statute would be,
“inconsistent with the fundamental requirements of Section 18(i) of the 1940 Act that every share of stock issued by a fund ( A fund is a company under Section 2(8) of the 1940 Act) be voting stock and have equal voting rights with every other outstanding voting stock.”
CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE ISSUE OF THE BOULDER LETTER:

Section 18(i) of the 1940 Act, as amended states that every share of stock issued by a registered investment company shall be a voting stock with equal rights. A defensive measure that limits the voting rights attached to a share potentially implicates the share voting requirements in Section 18(i) of the 1940 Act. A Control Share Statute generally prohibits an acquirer of “control shares” from voting its control shares unless or until its voting rights are reinstated by a vote of the disinterested shareholders.

In a 2007 opinion, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, inter alia applied the terms of the Maryland Control Share Acquisition Act (“MCSAA”) to shares acquired by a stockholder after the fund had opted in to the statute. In a 2009 speech, however, the director of the SEC’s Division of Investment Management expressed the view that a closed-end fund’s reliance on control share statutes “constitutes a denial of equal voting rights and may violate the fundamental requirement that every share of fund stock be voting stock.” Subsequently, the Boulder letter was issued.

CRITICISM OF THE BOULDER LETTER:

Recently, the Investment Company Institute submitted a report (“the ICI Report”) to the SEC that criticized the Boulder Letter’s stand on the issue. The ICI Report stated that the letter misreads the plain language of Section 18(i) because it pertains to the voting rights of each share of stock, rather than the voting rights of a particular stockholder.; The use of defensive measures, including a control share statute that impact the voting rights of a particular stockholder does not change the stock’s voting rights and thus, does not violate Section 18(i) of the 1940 Act.

In addition, if a disinterested shareholder vote restores an investor’s ability to vote control shares, or that investor sells or otherwise reduces his holdings below the applicable statutory threshold, that investor would again be permitted to vote on all his shares, and none of these events would change the voting rights of those shares. The ICI Report also argued that enabling the use of such takeover defenses to prevent activist shareholders from taking control of a fund for their own benefit at the expense of the fund and the other shareholders furthers the purposes of the 1940 Act.

REVERSAL OF SEC's STAND AND WITHDRAWAL OF BOULDER LETTER:

In 2018, SEC Chair Jay Clayton issued a statement noting that the “staff statements are nonbinding and create no enforceable legal rights or obligations of the Commission or other parties” and stating that the SEC’s divisions and offices “have been and will continue to review whether prior staff statements and staff documents should be modified, rescinded or supplemented in light of market or other developments.” Without commenting specifically on the several arguments that have been raised since 2010 regarding the Boulder Letter, in the statement the SEC staff announced that based on this review, as well as market developments since the Boulder Letter’s issuance and recent feedback from affected market participants, the Boulder Letter shall be withdrawn effective immediately.

The Statement also provides that the SEC staff:
“would not recommend enforcement action to the Commission against a closed-end fund under Section 18(i) of the 1940 Act for opting in to and triggering a control share statute if the decision to do so by the board of the fund was taken with reasonable care on a basis consistent with other applicable duties and laws and the duty to the fund and its shareholders generally.”
The SEC staff cautioned that any inquiry into the application of Section 18(i) of the 1940 Act to a fund’s decision to opt in to a control share statute would be based on the facts and circumstances. In this regard, the SEC staff reminded market participants that any actions taken by a board of a fund, including with regard to control share statutes, should be examined in light of:
  • the board’s fiduciary obligations to the fund,
  • applicable federal and state law provisions, and
  • the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the board’s action.
The 27th May 2020 statement adopts the position that the SEC staff “would not recommend enforcement action to the Commission against a closed-end fund under Section 18(i) of the 1940 Act for opting in to and triggering a control share statute if the decision to do so by the board of the fund was taken with reasonable care on a basis consistent with other applicable duties and laws and the duty to the fund and its shareholders generally.”

The statement also requests inputs as to whether the SEC staff should recommend that the SEC take an additional action to provide clarity regarding the applicability of the 1940 Act to a closed-end fund’s decision to opt in to a control share statute.

CONCLUSION:

For BDCs and CEFs this is good news since now they can freely utilize the defense available to them under the state laws which they were previously hesitant to use since the SEC staff statement though not binding did have an effect on the willingness of the board to rely on the Control Share Statutes.


-by Amar Singh


Keywords: Demerger, Companies Act 2013, Company Examples, Corporate restructuring
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Keywords: Demerger, shareholder value, corporate, corporate restructuring, Jio Demerger
demerger


(Dhruv Thakur is a IV year, B.B.A.LL.B student at Gujarat National Law University, GNLU)

INTRODUCTION:

Companies have now figured out that a diversified business model under one listed entity fails to attract the required valuation. In the previous decade, India witnessed a trend where companies rambled diversification drives beyond their central businesses. However, in today’s era, there is a clear inclination towards value unlocking by demerging business units which indicates many of them have now realized that the diversified business model does not work well in terms of stock valuations and fundraising compared to companies which stayed focused on their core businesses. But the question is whether in the last few years demergers have created value for shareholders? Before diving into that it is important to get familiarized with the fundamental idea behind a demerger.

DEFINITION AND RATIONALE OF A DEMERGER:

A Demerger is essentially separation of one or more units of a company to either be liquidated or form a new company independent from the original one. Primarily, demergers are a form of corporate restructuring the objective behind which is to promote specialization. Sections 230 to 240 of Chapter XV of the Companies Act, 2013 (hereinafter ‘CA, 2013’) read with the Companies (Compromises, Arrangements and Amalgamations) Rules, 2016 are the applicable provisions in case of a demerger. The term ’demerger’ is not defined under the CA, 2013 per se but explanation to Section 230 (1) allows for division of shares of different classes as a route for the readjustment of share capital. Section 2 (19AA) of Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter ‘IT Act’)defines a demerger as-

Demerger”, in relation to companies, means the transfer, pursuant to a scheme of arrangement under sections 391 to 394 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956, old act), by a demerged company of its one or more undertakings to any resulting company…

However, it was held by the High Court of Delhi in the matter of Indo Rama Synthetics Ltd. that the definition under the IT Act was only for the mere purpose of making sure that the demerger was tax neutral, irrespective of whether it fulfills other conditions as regarded by the IT Act.

The rationale behind pursuing demergers is based on the many benefits if offers, which works as motives for a company to initiate the process. It allows a specific division or unit to grow as a separate and focused entity, thereby increasing its efficiency and effectiveness.

To illustrate better, Reliance Jio Infocom Ltd. (hereinafter ‘RJI’) which had three primary undertakings namely (a) digital services business, (b) optical fibre business, and (c) tower infrastructure business went for an NCLT approved demerger process in 2019. It transferred the optical fibre business to a newly formed company ‘Jio Fibre Pvt Ltd.’ and the tower infrastructure business to an existing company ‘Reliance Jio Infratel Pvt Ltd’. However,the digital services business was retained with the original company (RJI).

Each of the three undertakings do have a distinct strategy, separate industry specific risks and operate inter alia under differentiated market dynamics. Even the competition involved in each of the businesses is different from the other two. Hence, segregation of the company by a demerger will incorporate enhanced focus of each of the undertakings and help exploit varied opportunities in their respective fields. Here’s a link to RJI’s composite scheme of arrangement.

Further, in a few cases of family owned companies, demergers are also used to give effect to family partitions, for instance the division of Ambani Group in 2013 between Anil and Mukesh Ambani, splitting up Reliance Industries Ltd. into four distinct entities.

WAYS TO GIVE EFFECT TO A MERGER:

Agreement between the promoters

Under this case a company may hive off its undertaking to a new resulting company. ​ This new company formed due to the demerger issues shares of the resulting company to shareholders of the parent company as consideration. The assets and liabilities pertaining to the undertaking which has been demerged will be transferred to the new resulting company.

2. Demerger under the scheme of arrangement

Similar to the amalgamation process, in this case approval from the NCLT, under CA, 2013 is mandatory. Provisions governing this route are Sections 230-232 of the CA, 2013. However, this route is only permissible if the Memorandum of Association (hereinafter ‘MoA’) and Articles of Association (hereinafter ‘AoA’) of the company allow for such a process. If not, then the first step would be to amend the AOA of the company by passing a special resolution in the general meeting.

3. Demerger under voluntary winding up and the power of liquidator

After the split of the original company into various companies, the original company can go for voluntary winding up under Section 270 of the CA, 2013. Original company may transfer or sell its workings to the resulting companies.

DEMERGERS AND SHAREHOLDERS' VALUE:

Demergers benefit the shareholders of the company by providing them shares of the applicant company (which is going for the demerger) as well as the resulting company (company segregated from applicant company), which in turn divests better opportunities to participate in the management, decision making process, operations and profits.

But is shareholder value in practice enhanced by demergers and spin-offs? It depends and needs to be carefully examined, as with everything else in life. It is a well-known fact that one of the major objectives behind demergers is to increase the shareholder value. Disposal of any undertaking, will replace cash and/or securities for assets. The benefits to shareholders are mightily dependent on the reaction of the stock market. The typical situation is where the subsidiary is in a high rated sector (rated highly by the market) and the seller is outmoded. Then as an inevitable result demerger unlocks the hidden value for shareholders who receive a part in the demerged equity.

To give an example, in 2016 Crompton Greaves through a court approved process demerged its consumer product business into a separate listed company ‘Crompton Greaves Consumer Electrical’. Consequentially, shareholders of Crompton Greaves were issued shares in the resulting company, The result of the arrangement was a 57% combined return of both original and resulting undertaking since its record date on March 16, 2016.

CONCLUSION:

Well, ideally shareholders of the demerged undertakings do reap the benefits of higher focussed businesses with management accountability driving the intrinsic value of each company, propelling their respective share prices higher than had they remained a combined entity. And spin-offs are usually preferred over IPOs by investors due to their assets being better known and better positioning of incentives due to the parent company’s wish for the progeny to succeed. That being said, have spin-offs underachieved after being demerged?

A few definitely have. All things considered, one thing is for certain, be it Crompton Greeves 2016 demerger (57% combined return) or Reliance Jio Infocom’s 2019 demerger, the value generated for shareholders is positively reflected in the market price of the demerged and resulting corporate entities where the split in undertakings is well defined and better thought out.

Keywords: M&A, takeover, PAC, Creeping acquisition, open offer, public announcement
takeover process

[Anjana Ravikumar is a III Year B.B.A.LL.B student at Gujarat National Law University (GNLU)]

INTRODUCTION

Since the advent of globalization, the doors of the Indian economy have been open for overseas investors. To compete on a global platform, companies have to continuously amplify the scale of their business. Mergers and Acquisitions (“M&A”) pave the way for a suitable option to capture the opportunities created by such policies.

BACKGROUND

One of the earliest takeovers in India can be traced back to the acquisition of Pukhuri Tea Co. Ltd. by Bishnauth Tea in 1965. However, the waves of corporate deal-making swept the Indian landscape during the 1980s, which witnessed tentative reforms under the Rajiv Gandhi administration. The first hostile takeover attempt was made out by the London based industrialist, Swaraj Paul in 1983.

A takeover is an acquisition of control of a registered company through the purchase or exchange of shares. A Merger on the other hand involves the amalgamation of two or more companies either through the exchange of shares or the formation of a new company. Thus, while mergers involve an amalgamation through mutual consent of the companies, acquisitions or takeovers may either be friendly or hostile. Further, in an acquisition, the target company is engulfed by the acquirer and hence ceases to exist, while in a merger it is the fusion of two or more companies into one new entity.

Takeovers have been associated with propelling economic efficiency. However, it has a tendency for being exploited as a weapon, at the disposal of corporate raiders with massive capital resources, often prejudicial to the interests of retail investors. To prevent such exploitation and encourage the growth of the securities market, SEBI was established in 1992 as a regulatory body.

Subsequently, the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover [SAST]) Regulations, 1997 were formulated; incorporating the suggestions of the PN Bhagwati Committee. These were substituted by the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover) Regulations in 2011 (hereinafter “Takeover Code”). based on the recommendations of the Takeover Regulations Advisory Committee (“TRAC”) headed by Mr. C. Achuthan.

IMPORTANT TERMINOLOGIES:

Persons acting in concert (“PACs”):

According to Regulation 2(1)(q) of the Takeover Code, PACs are persons who, in furtherance of a common objective or purpose of substantial acquisition of shares, voting rights, or gaining control over the target company. The same is done pursuant to a formal or informal agreement or an understanding which is pertaining to either directly or indirectly co-operating in acquiring, agreeing to acquire shares, voting rights or control of the target company. The question regarding whether two persons constitute PACs is to be answered based on an analysis of the facts and circumstances of the case.

The scope of PAC has been broadened to include a new class known as deemed PACs under regulation 2(1)(q)(2) of the latest Takeover Code. Deemed PACs include promoters, immediate relatives, trustees, a collective investment scheme and its company, venture capital fund, and its sponsor and asset management company. However, deemed PACs will be considered after the abovementioned PACs as acting in concert.
Acquirer

An acquirer is defined under regulation 2(1)(a) of the Takeover Code. Any person who by himself or through or with PACs, directly or indirectly acquires or agrees to acquire, shares, voting rights or control of the target company is called an acquirer. An acquirer may be a natural person, a corporate entity, or any other legal entity.

DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS:

To ensure that the price discovery of shares of the target company takes place in an informed manner, several disclosures have been made mandatory under Chapter V of the Takeover Code. The disclosures required are:
  • Disclosure of acquisition and disposal: It is required for all acquirers to disclose acquisitions of 5% or more voting rights of the target company within two working days after such acquisition. The disclosure must be made to every stock exchange where the shares of the company are listed and to the registered office of the target company. The same does not apply to a scheduled commercial bank or a public financial institution.
  • Continual disclosures: If any acquirer along with his PACs holds shares or voting rights entitling him to exercise 25% or more of voting rights in the target company, he is required to disclose the same. Further, every promoter along with his PACs is required to disclose their aggregate shareholding and voting rights in the form as specified in the Regulations.
  • Disclosure of encumbered shares: The promoter along with his PACs shall disclose details regarding any shares encumbered by them or any release or invocation of such encumbered shares to the stock exchange and the target company’s registered office within seven working days.Disclosure requirements thus, seek to protect the interest of the public stakeholders by ensuring transparency.
OPEN OFFER:

An open offer under the Takeover Code is an offer made by an acquirer to the shareholders of the target company inviting them to tender their shares at a particular price. It provides an exit option to the shareholders of the target company during a change in control or substantial acquisition of shares in the target company. Thus, open offer provides the public shareholders an opportunity to withdraw their investment when there is a change in the management or promoter shareholding.

The Takeover code stipulates clearly that not just direct but even indirect acquisitions of shares, voting rights or control will trigger an open offer. Indirect acquisition is defined under regulation 5(1) of the Takeover Code. It includes any acquisition of shares, voting rights in or control over any company which enables the acquirer and PACs, to exercise or direct the exercise of control over or voting rights in the target company. Such acquisition is made without attracting the obligation to make an announcement of public offer.

To protect the economic interests of the exiting shareholders of the target company, it has been made mandatory for the offer to be at the best possible terms for the shareholders. To ensure the same, the Takeover Code prescribes the timing, minimum offer size, price discovery mechanisms, etc. An open offer may be:

Mandatory Open Offers: The Takeover Code prescribes certain circumstances under which an acquirer is obliged to issue a mandatory tender offer to the existing shareholders of the target company to acquire at least a minimum of 26% of its shares. The triggers/ circumstances include:

  1. Initial Trigger – When the acquirer along with his PACs plans to acquire shares which allows them to exercise 25% or more of the voting rights in the company.
  2. Consolidation Trigger – When acquirer and PACs together hold 25% or more of shares or voting rights but it is less than the maximum permissible limit of non-public shareholding in a target company.
  3. Control Trigger – When an acquirer gains control over the target company, irrespective of shares owned.
  4. Trigger on Indirect Acquisition – When an acquirer indirectly acquires the ability to exercise voting rights or control over target company as specified in initial, consolidation, or control triggers.
Voluntary Open Offer: A voluntary offer is made by an existing shareholder or an acquirer who holds no shares. Under Regulation 6 of the Takeover Code, a voluntary offer is to be made when the acquirer and PACs exercise a minimum of 25% or more of voting rights but less than the maximum limit of non-public shareholding in the target company. Voluntary offers have to be made for a minimum of 10% of the total shareholding of the target company.

Competing Offer: The Takeover Code under Regulation 20 permits third parties to make offers to the shareholders providing exit opportunities while the acquirer’s open offer subsists. This creates orderly competition among acquirers.

PROCEDURE OF AN OPEN OFFER:

The major steps involved in the open offer process are as follows:

CREEPING ACQUISITION:

· Covered under Regulation 3(2) of the Takeover Code, Creeping Acquisition is a means to facilitate the consolidation of shares, voting rights, or control in the company by persons already holding or controlling a substantial number of shares.

· Under this provision, acquisition of voting shares in a listed company; without public announcement; in excess of 25%, is permissible provided that the acquisition is limited to 5% in one financial year.

· Every financial year, an additional 5% voting rights can be acquired by an acquirer with PACs. However, this additional acquisition via creeping acquisition can only extend up to a total shareholding of 75% of the share capital.

· Beyond this 75% limit, a public announcement is mandatory. The 5% limit is to be calculated by aggregating all purchases, without including the aggregate sales.

EXEMPTIONS FROM OPEN OFFERS:

The exemptions applicable to open offers are dealt with under Regulation 10 and 11 of the Takeover Code. Circumstances under which a company is exempt from the issue of open offer include:

1. Inter se Transfers: Inter se transfers occur between immediate relatives, between a company and its subsidiaries, holding company and other subsidiaries of such holding company are exempt from the obligation of issuing open offer. Transfer to PAC for three years or more, prior to the proposed acquisition is also exempted.

Regulation 10(1)(a)(ii) of the Takeover Code provides for inter se transfer amongst promoters which can be exempted only if the said promoter holds shares for at least three years, prior to such acquisition. Inter se transfers are exempt from the obligation of open offer since there is no change in ownership per se.

2. Trusts: The transfer of shares to trusts are exempt from the obligation of open offer under the following conditions:

  • Such transfer shall not affect the ownership or control of shares or voting rights in the target company.
  • The trust is a mirror image of the promoter holding such shares.
  • Only individual promoters, immediate relatives, or lineal descendants can be the beneficiaries of the trust.
  • The beneficial interest shall not be transferred, assigned, or encumbered.
  • After dissolution, the assets can be transferred only to beneficiaries or their legal heirs.
  • The trustees cannot transfer or delegate their powers.
3. Intermediaries: The transfer of shares in return for services rendered are exempt from the obligation of open offer. Intermediaries include underwriters, stockbrokers, merchant bankers, registered stock marker, and scheduled commercial banks acting as an escrow agent.

4. Insolvency and Bankruptcy: The acquirers of distressed companies are not obliged to make an open offer. The acquisitions of Bhushan Steel by Tata Steel is one such acquisition under IBC which was exempted from open offer obligation.

5. Disinvestment: Defined under Regulation 2(g) of the Takeover Code, disinvestment is the direct or indirect sale by the Central/State Government or by a government company of shares, voting rights or control over a target company, which is a public sector undertaking. Acquisition of shares during disinvestment is exempt from the obligation of open offer.

6. Investment Funds: Alternate Investment Funds and Venture Capital Funds are exempted from making an open offer, when their investments cross the threshold which triggers an open offer.

7. Buyback of shares: If the buyback of shares results in an increased shareholding of the promoter, it will not trigger an open offer.

8. Forfeiture of shares: Increase in voting rights of existing shareholders due to forfeiture of partly paid shares and non-payment by defaulting shareholders does not necessitate the issue of an open offer.

9. Acquisition under the SARFAESI Act, 2002: The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI) vests in banks the power to auction properties of borrowers who default the loan payment.

Asset Reconstruction Companies acquiring financial assets from banks and other financial institutions are duty-bound to return them upon recovery of the amount. Such acquisitions under SARFAESI Act, therefore, fall within the ambit of exemption from open offers.

Acquisitions by way of transmissions, inheritance, succession, rights issue, and exchange of shares also fall within this exemption. When the company is unsure about the exemption of a proposed transaction, it may seek informal guidance from SEBI through an application. Further, SEBI also has the discretionary power to grant exemptions for specific transactions, in the interest of the stakeholders of the company though not provided for in the code.

PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT:

When the acquirer acquires voting rights of the target company, in excess of limits prescribed under Regulation 3 and 4 of the Takeover Code, the acquirer is required to give a Public Announcement of Open offer to the shareholders of the target company.

It contains details about the offer, the acquirer(s)/PAC, the transaction which triggered the open offer or the underlying transaction details of selling shareholders (if any), the target company, and the price and mode of payment. It is the first announcement made by the acquirer disclosing details of the intention to acquire the shares of the target company from existing shareholders through an open offer.

Public Announcement is issued on behalf of the acquirer, by the Manager to the offer, in the format as provided under Regulation 15(1) of the Takeover Code. The Takeover Code also prescribes a specific timeline for Public Announcement. Public announcements are essential to safeguard the interests of the shareholders.

DETAILED PUBLIC STATEMENT (DPS):

The DPS is the second announcement made by the acquirer and the PACs disclosing all relevant information regarding the open offer. It enables the shareholders to make an informed decision regarding the open offer. Under Regulation 13(4) of the Takeover Code, a DPS shall be published by the acquirer through the manager to the offer within a maximum of five working days from the date of Public Announcement. Regulation 15(2) of the Takeover Code provides the format for the Detailed Public Statement.

LETTER OF OPEN OFFER (LO):

After the publication of Detailed Public Statement (DPS), within 5 days, the acquirer through the manager of the offer is required to file a draft letter of offer with SEBI. SEBI is required to revert with its comments on the LO within 15 working days. SEBI oversees that the disclosures contained in the LO are adequate and in conformity with the Regulations. Once approved by SEBI, it is dispatched to the shareholders of the target company as on an identified date.

While the PA and the DPS are made by the acquirer to inform the public of an exit opportunity available to them, the LOO is an offer made by the acquirer to the identified shareholder of the target company to purchase their shares.

CONCLUSION:

Although not all corporate takeovers may be deemed beneficial to the economy, an overwhelming majority of them are economically justifiable and are not mere opportunistic managerial power-grabs. SEBI has constantly strived to curb undesirable practices and protect the interests of investors to encourage mergers and takeovers.

The new Code based on the suggestions of the TRAC has relied on court rulings, International Takeover Codes, and sound statistical analysis to plug all loopholes. It aims to provide clarity by simplifying and aligning with internationally accepted practices.

The ever-evolving public M&A landscape continues to throw new challenges for SEBI to address. However, the new Takeover Code presently is at par with any foreign code on mergers and acquisitions and continues to ensure a systematic and transparent mechanism for takeovers in India.
-By Anjana Ravikumar

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